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a b s t r a c t
Cryptography is a key element in establishing trust and enabling services in the digital world. Currently,
cryptography is realized with mathematical operations and represented in ways that are not readily
accessible to human users. Thus, humans are left out of the loop when establishing trust and security in
the digital world. In many areas the interaction between users and machines is being made more and
more seamless and user-friendly, but cryptography has not really enjoyed such development. In this
paper, we review the previous research on utilizing human senses and capabilities in cryptography.
We present the most relevant existing methods and summarize the current state of the art. In addition,
we propose several topics and problems that need to be solved in order to build cryptography that
is more accessible to humans. These range from practical implementations of existing methods and
utilizing a wider range of human senses all the way to building the theoretical foundations for this
new form of cryptography.
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nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Cryptography is a key building block in modern communica-
tion protocols and a necessary ingredient to many digital services.
Advances in cryptography in the last 40–50 years have brought
us public key cryptography [1], digital signatures (e.g. [2]), securerticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-

























































nd efficient encryption algorithms (e.g. AES [3]), homomorphic
ncryption [4] and secure multi-party computation [5], to name a
ew examples. These are being utilized by billions of people daily
n the form of different digital services such as messaging, online
anking and shopping, web browsing, cloud computing etc.
Modern cryptography is based on provable security. This
eans that for a given cryptographic primitive or protocol there
hould be clearly defined security goals (and corresponding threat
odels) and a proof (usually by reduction) that shows how the
roposed system achieves these goals and under what assump-
ions. Although there is some criticism towards this approach,
.g. [6,7], it is widely accepted as one of the best guarantees
f (theoretical) security for cryptosystems. Of course, the actual
mplementations can and do suffer from various vulnerabilities
nd flaws that can be exploited, e.g. [8,9]. However, without a
ecurity proof, there would be even less evidence on the security
f a cryptosystem, even if the implementation may fail in ways
hat are not envisioned in the original threat model, e.g. side
hannels through timing and power consumption.
Despite these advances and the benefits that have been gained,
here is an area of cryptography that is not covered in great detail
nd which lacks comprehensive solutions. The current paradigm
f provable security tends to leave the human users of systems
ut of the picture and to build the security models around the
biquitous client–server model of communications. This model is
f course perfectly adequate in machine to machine communica-
ions, but it is not enough for describing the human factor, which
he user brings to the system.
In addition to the above paradigm, modern cryptography is
lmost completely outside of human capabilities. In order to use
ncryption, authentication and other cryptographic functionali-
ies, users need to utilize a computer to carry out the crypto-
raphic tasks. There are only a few notable exceptions, that have
een studied in more detail, such as visual cryptography [10].
n visual cryptography a human user can decrypt the machine-
ncrypted message by merely looking at the correctly positioned
hares of the message. More recently there has been proposed a
heory on human computable functions that could be utilized in
ryptography [11]. These ideas have been utilized in the context
f password authentication [12,13], but not more generally in
ryptography.
Bringing about a change in the current and in many ways
ery good paradigm raises some questions. What would this new
pproach achieve? Why would we need such human-friendly
ystems, when we have very good mechanisms that can be run
n computers and computers are becoming more and more ubiq-
itous? The answer lies partly already in the second question
nd in the changes that are coming about in our society. We are
ow giving a lot of power to the machines and algorithms run
y very opaque systems. Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine
earning have become parts of our everyday life and different
lgorithms affect us in many ways. This development is not
ithout problems and many potentially adverse effects of this
evelopment have been discussed (see [14] for a recent survey
n the topic).
One problem with this development is that we have no mech-
nisms to use human senses and capabilities to evaluate the
orrectness of these computations and algorithms. This needs to
hange and there are valid and good cryptographic methods to
uild trust, transparency and privacy to these systems. The old
dage of ‘‘trust, but verify’’ should apply to decisions made by AI
and algorithms. However, we need cryptography that is acces-
sible to human users and that can build trust and verification
capabilities for human–machine interaction. Some ideas towards
this kind of functionality, especially in the augmented and virtual
reality domains, have been presented in [15].
2
Table 1
Achieving different cryptographic goals with different methods and senses. A
✓means that the goal is achievable with the method or sense and an ‘‘N’’ means
that it is not achievable with currently known methods.
Goal / method Symmetric Asymmetric Vision Hearing Touch Smell
Perfect secrecy ✓ ✓ ✓ N N N
IND-CPA ✓ ✓ ✓ N N N
IND-CCA ✓ ✓ ✓ N N N
Data integrity ✓ ✓ N N N N
Dender authentication Partial ✓ N N N N
Nonrepudiation N ✓ N N N N
To further illustrate the motivation behind this paper we drew
Fig. 1. It depicts the difference between what our basic client–
server model should ideally and hopefully be, what it actually
is, and how allowing human users to naturally interact with
cryptography could change the situation.
The aim of this paper is to review the existing research on the
use of human senses in cryptography and cryptographic proto-
cols. The results of this review will point out the possible gaps
and thus also the potential future research direction in this field
(see Table 1 on Section 2.9 for details). These open problems will
be discussed in the later sections of this article.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
and summarizes the previous work on the topic of cryptography
with human senses and capabilities. The third section presents
our ideas on how to address this problem and what possible
venues of research could lead into better solutions. We end the
paper with discussion and conclusions of our work.
2. Previous work
Previous work directly focusing on this problem of cryptog-
raphy for human senses is fairly scarce. There are many ways in
which usability of security measures has been studied and also
interesting proposals on specific domains such as authentication,
where some focus has been given to user-friendliness and some
results have been achieved. On the other hand, comprehensive
solutions to the problem of cryptography for human senses are
not available. Furthermore, there is an almost complete lack of
theoretical study over this topic.
2.1. Visual cryptography
Visual cryptography is one of the only solutions that address
the problem of cryptography for human senses. The original idea
from [10] shows how to construct a visual encryption of a picture
(black and white) that can be decrypted by just looking at the
shares. The method is based on the method of secret sharing
from [16] and a picture can be encrypted into two or more
shares. This requires machine computations. In decrypting the
message, the different shares need to be aligned correctly. After
this, the secret image appears and the user can see the secret
image without any computational help.
There are several extensions to the original scheme for exam-
ple to colour images [17], rotating images [18] and other capabili-
ties [19,20]. Different kinds of visual cryptography schemes have
been compiled in surveys before, for example in [21] and [22].
Comparisons of technical merits for different schemes is out of
scope for this paper.
There are also applications of these ideas to authentication
e.g. [23–25]. However, these only provide the user the possi-
bility to decrypt the information from the shares of images.
Furthermore, visual cryptography only provides perfect secrecy.
Despite the name, it is only one possible security goal and it is
not suitable for many applications of modern cryptography. The
K. Halunen and O.-M. Latvala Computer Science Review 39 (2021) 100340Fig. 1. The first image presents the status quo in an ideal world: cryptography used between machines is strong and implemented without faults. The user is trusting
and happy that things simply work. The second image depicts the status quo as it really is: malicious actors may compromise any part of the system, and not
everything is implemented to perfection in the first place. The user remains trusting and happy. The third image represents our motivation: a human user that is
included in the cryptographic processes in a way natural to us is able to perceive the problems. They are less happy, but more informed.existing systems cannot achieve more advanced properties such
as authenticated encryption or public key cryptography. The good
aspect of visual cryptography is that there is a security proof for
these schemes and a well-founded theory around the problem.
2.2. Visualizable encryption
In [26] the authors present the EyeDecrypt system for using
augmented reality (AR) in solving some of the issues related to
untrusted terminals and shoulder surfing. Different solutions to
this problem have been proposed earlier and the more interesting
part of the paper is the formalization of visualizable encryption.
This extends the normal CPA (chosen plaintext attack) and
CCA (chosen ciphertext attack) adversarial models and respective
security games more towards systems, where also the human
behaviour and interaction with the different devices is taken into
account. They are able to show that it is possible to construct CPA-
and CCA-secure visualizable encryption schemes from respective
regular encryption schemes together with secure hash and MAC
functions.
Still their system is only for vision and only implements sym-
metric encryption, which requires a key exchange between the
server and the user device. This key exchange is not defined to
have any human verifiable or visualizable components. Thus, this
system is a promising start, but not a full solution to the problem
of human cryptography. However, these systems enjoy a security
proof and thus form a good start of a theoretical foundation for
cryptography for human senses.
2.3. Computer-aided security schemes
One possibility to help human users is to provide the users
with computer-aided systems, where human user provides part
of the secret information and then the input terminal augments
this by brute force with the help of some external informa-
tion (a hint). This has been proposed in [27] and the authors
present symmetric and asymmetric encryption possibilities as3
well as a user authentication method with computer-aided se-
curity schemes.
Although interesting and probably suitable for several ap-
plications, this type of approach is unsatisfactory from several
points of view. First of all, it places trust in the terminal that
the human user uses for cryptographic tasks. This is something
that cryptography for human senses should overcome. That is,
users should be able to perform the cryptographic tasks directly
themselves from the output of the terminal and to be able to
notice if something is not correct. The users should not be made
to rely on the terminal to work for them.
Secondly, the proposed methods of [27] are essentially sys-
tems, where part of the key is encoded as a human password
(randomized) and the other part is brute-forced by the terminal
and the cryptographic processes are same as in conventional
systems. Although it is possible to have human users memorize
even difficult passwords [28], it is far from a perfect solution and
not something that is completely accessible with human senses.
On the other hand, the systems in [27] enjoy fairly simple security
proofs as they can rely on tried and true regular encryption
schemes with very little modifications.
2.4. Hash visualization
In [29] the authors present the idea of hash visualization.
Their premise is that human users are not good at comparing
meaningless strings (e.g. hash values in hexadecimal), but are
more attuned into seeing differences in pictures. They propose a
mechanism called Random Art to implement their visual hashing
scheme. They also propose a formalism to evaluate and provide
proofs of security for hash visualization systems, but unfortu-
nately are unable to prove the Random Art construction secure
in this framework.
This line of work has continued in different forms and [30]
presents a comparison of different hash visualization methods.
The study considers nine different methods, where some are
based on strings of characters (in different languages) and some


























































n visual images e.g. Random Art, Flag [31] and T-Flag [32]. The
esults show, that the accuracy is good (97%–98% for all other
ethods except English words with ‘‘only’’ 94%) when comparing
asy pairs (great differences), but much worse for hard pairs
small differences) except for Random Art (94%). On the other
and, the authors state that even though Random Art is capable
f displaying 160-bits of entropy, there is no proof that this
ould be equal to the perceived entropy that the users actually
xperience when viewing the images.
Hash visualization has been used in some applications to es-
ablish the authenticity of connections and keys, e.g. in the n-Auth
obile authentication scheme [33]. However, these systems do
ot provide the level of security and formalism that is required for
ryptography for human senses. Furthermore, this is yet another
echnology that is based on vision and leaves out other senses.
.5. Authentication of users, devices and computations
A substantial amount of work has been done related to dif-
erent authentication schemes with human-verifiable outcomes.
n these schemes the goal is that human users can verify the
esult of the authentication (e.g. device pairing) in a simple way.
he methods vary from visual comparison of some values in the
evices to be authenticated to physical actions such as bumping
he phones together ([34] gives an analysis of some of these
ethods).
Many human-verifiable authentication systems are based on
isual cues like barcodes [35] or light [36]. These offer users
he possibility to visually check that the authentication was cor-
ectly performed and that there are no attackers meddling in the
iddle. This type of visual feedback is efficient to check.
Of course, vision is not the only way for users to check the
esult of an authentication. Other types of comparison methods
nclude sound [37], shaking of the device [38], proximity of other
evices [39] and combinations such as demonstrated in [40]. The
oal of all these is to provide a method for the users to gain
ssurance that the authentication has been performed correctly
r to make sure that the authentication cannot be performed
ithout the user’s consent.
The scalability of some of the above methods has been ques-
ioned and some improvements to that have been proposed
n [41]. There are also many other proposals in the same vein
s those already presented. A good survey on the topic of device
airing (authentication) and comparison of different methods has
een made by [42].
Some methods that aim for a larger trust than merely pro-
iding verifiable authentication to a system include for example
afeSlinger [43], where the authentication of a group of recipients
s paired with an easy to use secure file transfer as well as
ther protocols. However, this is still a very constrained form
f verification as there is no human-verifiable component af-
er the establishment of keys. The protocol also relies on the
roup of people to have close proximity or a secure channel to
uthenticate i.e. compare some hash values, at least initially.
The cryptographic methods for securing electronic and online
oting systems have been studied quite extensively from both
echnical [44,45] and societal and legal aspects [46]. There are
ethods that provide at least in theory a possibility to hold
ecure and anonymous elections in this fashion. In many cases
erifiability is not completely human-centric [47], and usually
hese cannot be generalized to other types of computational tasks
eyond voting. More comprehensive studies on these issues can
e found for example in [48] and [49].
There are also some human-verifiable election systems, e.g.,
50]. These give the voters a way to verify that their ballot has
een correctly included in the tally of the votes. As such, they pro-
ide another special case of computing that has verifiability with4
human senses, but not a comprehensive solution to the problem
of cryptography or even ‘‘just’’ authentication with human senses
only.
There are also many other areas, where solutions to single
problems related to authentication and human capabilities have
been addressed. In [51] a method for human users to authenti-
cate possibly untrusted terminals is presented and it is used to
access some remote services. The paper describes two different
protocols that achieve this property for different threat models.
In [52] the authors show a method for using human visual ca-
pabilities to digital rights management and user authentication
based on schemas in visual memory. There have also been pro-
posals for a method for authenticating pervasive devices with
human protocols [53] and a way for message authentication for
humans [54].
The problem with all of the above systems is that the verifi-
cation that they provide for human senses is only applicable in
a very narrow use case. For a cryptographic system to be widely
applicable, it needs to be able to process arbitrary data. Also not
all presented examples have rigorous security proofs, which could
be adapted to constructions that are more general.
2.6. PRISM & iTurtle
The above methods in authentication are focused on very spe-
cific use cases and are not applicable to general computations as
such. There are methods that aim for more general authentication
and verifiability of computations and digital systems. The most far
reaching results are from [55] and [56].
First there is PRISM [55], a system for human users to au-
thenticate a (legacy) system with very little trust on external
technology. Their proposed implementation requires the user to
have a list of challenge–response pairs with related timing infor-
mation and a watch to measure time. The challenge is presented
to the device and both the response and the execution time are
measured. If these do not match to the list, the user will not trust
the device.
The PRISM system shows some ways, in which humans can be
included in the verification of a computational device. However,
the solution is only partial and it requires the system under in-
vestigation to be of very limited functionality. The system should
not have any connectivity to the Internet, for example. Thus, it
is not of use in a modern environment where almost everything
is connected to the Internet. On the other hand, PRISM has a
security proof in its threat model.
The iTurtle [56] is a trusted device for attesting the func-
tionality of other devices that the user has. Their proposal is a
theoretical one and they explicitly want to avoid using cryptog-
raphy in their device, as it would make the device too complex to
their liking. Their system design is based on having a trusted de-
vice (the iTurtle) with very limited functionality (red/green lights
for reject/accept) and having that device test other devices and
software for ‘‘known-good’’ configurations, before using them.
This approach is also interesting, but the limitations of the
system are such that it is not suitable for solving most of the
problems that could be solved with cryptography for human
senses. For example, it is next to impossible to define known-
good configurations to a complex system (say, a smart phone or
an operating system). Even in cases where this could be possible,
new attacks or functionalities can change what a known-good
configuration is. This would require updating the iTurtle device
and as mentioned in [56], how would this device know the
difference between a legitimate update and a malicious attack.
Especially, as the device would not have capacity to do crypto-
graphic operations. Furthermore, there is no security proof for
iTurtle.














































































































The main limitation of both of these approaches is still in
heir scope. Although more generic than mere user authentication
r voting they still impose a lot of restrictions on the data,
ystems, hardware and software that can be verified. However,
hey contain elements that could be applicable in more generic
ryptography for human senses.
.7. Security proofs including human elements
Many of the methods above do not have a security proof or
he human element is not clearly present in the proof. There
re several different ways in which human elements have been
ncorporated in to security proofs in some cryptographic systems.
his section reviews some of the most relevant ones.
One of the first protocols for secure human authentication is
resented in [57]. Their protocol is secure against active adver-
aries, but is unfortunately too inefficient to be used in practice.
he method is based on error correcting codes and provides
ser authentication between a user and a server. As with many
ther protocols of this nature, this only yields authentication
nd not other cryptographic properties. The main advantage of
his protocol is in the rigorous security proof that is lacking in
any alternatives. The paper states that the goal is to build a
.1, .1, 10) human executable protocol. This means that 90% of the
opulation would succeed in the protocol in 10 s with a proba-
ility of 90%. The construction presented in the paper achieves
.9, .2, 300) human executable protocol (10% of population with
0% probability in 300 s).
Also in [58] security proofs for protocols involving humans are
resented. The high-level aim is in human followable security. In
he paper they provide a solution to a much simpler problem that
hey call human perceptible freshness. Their application area is
he Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [59]. Their systems
dds a layer of communications with human understandable
orm on top of the regular TLS protocol. Thus the human has a
ossibility to accept or reject the connection after the initial TLS
andshake, if the human perceptible freshness check does not
ass. Again this protocol is of limited use as a general crypto-
raphic protocol, but the concepts are valuable and applicable in
wider context as well.
Two generic human authenticated key exchange (HAKE) proto-
ols are defined and proofs for the security of such systems are
rovided in [60]. The protocols work with three parties, a human
ser, a terminal and a server. In this way, the protocol extends
he conventional client–server model by including also a human
ser.
There are also several definitions on human aspects of com-
uting that are employed in the protocols. The authors define
uman compatible computation that can then be utilized in
hallenge–response protocols for key exchange. The concepts are
uman-readable, human-writeable, human-memorizable,
uman-computable and human-sampleable.
These are defined again in a very visual fashion with ASCII
ymbols being considered readable and writable by humans. Also
he other three concepts are defined by heuristic assumptions on
verage human capabilities.
The formalism of [60] is excellent and provides great results
n the topic of authenticated key exchange. However, after the
ey exchange, the active parties in the encrypting and decrypting
ata are the terminal and the server. Thus the HAKE protocols
o not solve the problem of providing cryptography for human
enses. This could be achieved, if the keys could be incorporated
o a cryptographic protocol for human senses.
One of the most advanced applications with a security proof
s from [61]. Their method enables two human users to compute
value of a function f (x, y), where x and y represent the private5
nputs of the different parties without the aid of computer sys-
ems. This method combines the secret sharing methods of visual
ryptography, with the theory of garbled circuits. The process
or the human users is physical and involves using scissors and
ransparencies in addition to visual cryptography.
In [60] there is no usability evaluation of the system and their
onstruction is not very simple to follow, especially when more
nvolved functions would be evaluated with this method. Further-
ore, the security proof is valid only for the honest-but-curious
dversarial model. However, the result is very promising and
hows that there are possibilities in applying human capabilities
ven in more advanced cryptography.
.8. Complexity of human computation
Recently, there have been some advances in defining the hu-
an computational capabilities. The authors in [11] define a
omplexity theory for human computational capabilities and pro-
ide examples of human computable pseudorandom generators
nd one-way functions. These are essential building blocks in
odern cryptography and the theory is well founded and sound.
t can also be applied in many contexts and provides a good foun-
ation for building new cryptographic systems more accessible to
uman users.
The main applications of this theory are passwords, which
ave been studied in [13] and [12]. The results are promising,
lthough the time to learn the functions that are used to generate
nd protect the passwords is considerable. The upside with pass-
ords is that repetition comes quite naturally and this reinforces
he learning of the necessary functions.
These works provide an excellent background for more com-
lex cryptographic systems that we envision in the following
ection. The main shortcoming of this type of computational
pproach to cryptography with human capabilities is that it is
uch less intuitive to users than for example visual cryptography
nd visualizable encryption, which have been discussed earlier.
hus the application of this type of schemes requires more effort
rom the users.
.9. Summary of the state of the art
To summarize our findings on the state of the art for current
ryptographic methods for human senses, we have compiled two
ables.
In Table 1 we present some of the most common goals for
ryptographic systems and compare these with different methods
nd human capabilities for realizing cryptographic systems. As
an be seen, traditional symmetric and asymmetric cryptogra-
hy can achieve most or all goals, whereas human senses have
nly had success with visual methods. The partial result in the
ymmetric encryption with sender authentication means that in
ne-on-one connections the other participant can be assured that
he other participant has sent something (that she herself did
ot), but in group settings or to a third party this is not possible.
We have left out other human capabilities besides human
enses from Table 1 as out of scope for this time. However,
e believe that there are several human capabilities that might
e possible for applications even in cryptography. These will
e discussed in later sections of this paper and these contain
nteresting future research problems. We have also excluded the
ore advanced cryptographic goals such as homomorphic en-
ryption, secure multi-party computation etc. as these are not yet
s commonly available even with traditional, computer-executed
ethods. Thus, the results of [61] are not shown in the table.
ven if that result would be included, the system is still limited to






















































isual perception and would not add to the capabilities of other
enses.
A summary of different concepts of cryptography for human
enses and capabilities is presented in Table 2. The way the
oncepts are defined varies a lot, but here we have used a two
oint scale to assess whether the definition is more heuristic or
uantitative in nature. Threat models are available for some of
he concepts, as are use cases. The more mature concepts can be
chieved in many different ways, but the less developed ones do
ot have an implementation, yet.
It is also interesting to note, that many of the threat models
re very specific to each of the given constructions. Thus, there is
o unified theoretical setting from which these systems are built.
or some notions the threat model has not even been defined. The
onclusion from this is that the field has not yet matured towards
ore universal theory and definitions.
. Cryptography for human senses and capabilities
In order to achieve new levels for cryptography for human
enses and some applications for users, we propose different
enues of further research. These can and should all be ap-
roached in parallel in order to achieve a real shift towards more
uman-friendly cryptography.
.1. Extending and applying visual cryptography
The lowest hanging fruit on this new research venue (in our
pinion) would be to start applying and extending the currently
nown visual cryptography methods. Some work towards this
nd has already been done by, e.g., [25,64,65]. Applications for
he more advanced methods have not been reported, but these
ould be forthcoming in suitable AR applications, for example.
Another direction would be to extend the capabilities of vi-
ualizable encryption to public key cryptography, authenticated
ncryption, digital signatures etc. This would require also new
efinitions and theory for such systems. For this reason, it is
robably a much harder and long-term endeavour.
The main shortcoming of visual cryptography (and visualizable
ncryption) is that it requires a certain level of visual capability
rom the user, which is not available to all humans. For ex-
mple, the WHO (World Health Organization) states that over
50 million people suffer from impaired vision. Out of these,
pproximately 36 million are totally blind [66]. Thus, a remark-
ble number of people (especially elderly people) would be left
ut from the benefits of human cryptography, if only visual or
isualizable cryptography would be available. It is interesting to
ote that currently CAPTCHA [67] security questions on web-
ites tend to have a button, which provides the visual challenge
n an audible form. Having similar functionality for visual and
isualizable encryption is most likely very difficult if not com-
letely impossible. Furthermore, this functionality has been used
o defeat the very protection the CAPTCHA aims to provide [68].
.2. Cryptography for other senses
It is peculiar to note that for other senses such as hearing,
here are no cryptographic constructions similar to visual cryp-
ography. As sound is formed of waves and with superposition
ne can achieve e.g. noise cancelling, it is entirely possible to
hink that at least similar secret sharing schemes as in visual
ryptography could be fairly easy to construct. This could be
ormed from two or more sounds that in themselves are ‘‘ran-
om noise’’, but in some specific conditions cancel out to form
n understandable sound of some sort. Thus, not only visual,
ut also auditory cryptography could be achieved. This could be6
another way to start expanding cryptography to human senses.
After all, sonification (the use of non-speech audio to convey
information) is already being tested in network monitoring and
situation awareness contexts, see for example [69–71].
Of course, there are also other senses available for human
users. The sense of smell is interesting and less applied and
studied in the digital context than vision and hearing. There are
some ideas on how this could be utilized in the digital world,
for example in user authentication [72]. Synthetic odours can
be realized and utilized, too [73,74]. Whether or not scents can
work as an effective method for human cryptography is an open
question. The sense of smell is quite different from vision and
hearing, as it is based on detecting different kinds of molecules
while the other two are based on detecting electromagnetic or
pressure waves. There probably is no simple way to convert a
visual cryptography scheme to a scent-based scheme.
Tactile feedback for users has also been used for example
in gaming and mobile phone alerts for several years. With the
increase in VR devices and services, even more immersive tactile
feedback systems have been realized. Such systems offer possi-
bilities for using this part of human senses for cryptography as
well.
One interesting possible venue would be to use some form of
tactile gloves and a surface capable for projecting dots as in Braille
system. A possible direction of research could be to see, if the
ideas from visual cryptography could be extended to this type of
information, where parts of the Braille come from the surface and
parts from the glove.
The idea of haptic gloves is becoming quite popular. In ad-
dition to the straightforward gaming gloves under development
for various VR or AR platforms, there is the Sleeve by Nokia Bell
Labs [75], an armband that is supposed to convey emotions be-
tween users. If such a device can indeed assess a user’s emotional
state accurately, that data could be used for other purposes as
well. This is similar to the idea of using brain–computer-interface
technology for interacting with computers. For example, in [76]
the idea of pass-thoughts for user authentication is presented.
3.3. Beyond symmetric cryptography
To really change the current paradigm of human-friendly cryp-
tographic systems there needs to be advances in the capabilities
of the cryptographic systems that are possible to realize with
human senses. For example, visual cryptography offers ‘‘only’’
perfect secrecy, which has been deemed inadequate for most
modern cryptographic needs and is being replaced by systems
that offer CPA or CCA security. Most importantly, perfect secrecy
does not offer any authentication on the data. Currently, the
preferred standard for symmetric encryption systems is authen-
ticated encryption with associated data. This can be achieved
with a secure block cipher and a suitable mode of operation.
Visualizable encryption provides theoretical foundations for such
approach, but the actual implementation of the method of [26]
falls short of providing these fully.
Because public-key cryptography has been a key enabler in
many digital services, it would be important to have such capabil-
ities for human cryptography. To this end, there is currently no
research either in theory or in practice. The public key systems
(both traditional and post-quantum) are based on heavy math-
ematics that is not practical to apply to human senses. Finding
replacements for these building blocks is an interesting research
problem and a necessary step to achieve cryptography for human
senses and capabilities.
Of course, there is no reason to stop at only public key
cryptography. If such systems could be devised, there could be
possibilities to build (partially) homomorphic encryption sys-
tems [4], identity and attribute-based cryptography [77,78] and



































ifferent concepts of cryptography for human senses and their capabilities.
Concept Def.a Threat model Use case Achievability
Visual cryptography [10] Q Perfect secrecy Decryption Multiple methods
Visualizable cryptography [26] Q CPA & CCA Decryption & verification One method / partial
Visual hashing [29,30] Q Near-one-way functionb Verification Multiple methods
Human compatible function
families [60]
H HAKEb Authenticated Key Exchange Multiple methods
Human followable security [58] H Undefined Verification Not currently possible
Human perceptible freshness
[58]
H H-ACCEb Session authentication Generic compiler presented
Human perceptible
authenticator [62]
H Active adversary [63] User authentication One method
Human executable protocols
[57]
H Passive & active adversaryb User authentication Multiple methods





aThis column signifies whether the concept is defined more heuristically (H) or quantitatively (Q) in the original paper.
bThe threat model is specific to a construction presented in the original paper.many other concepts that have been proposed and studied in
traditional cryptography. Again finding suitable methods that do
not require excessive computation is a key problem to be solved.
3.4. Encryption with human senses and abilities
Although it might be argued that decryption and verification
ith human senses are more important, the option to also en-
rypt (and sign) with human senses and abilities should not be
ismissed as a research problem. All the existing systems work
n the assumption that the encryption part of the cryptography
s done by a computer. Only decryption (or verification) is done
y human senses.
Building a fully-fledged system for human cryptography would
f course require the ability to encrypt information without the
elp of computers. For authentication, one could use handwritten
ignatures, which has been common in the past. However, making
ure that these are not copied or altered in transit in digital form
s not guaranteed by any means and also the human verification
ight be susceptible to errors.
Traditionally systems that enable humans to encrypt and de-
rypt have been horribly insecure against computer-aided ad-
ersaries. The question then becomes: What are the things that
umans can do better than machines and computers in a way
hat other machines and computers cannot decipher the results of
hose actions? It is safe to say that mathematics is probably not
he way to go. The next problem is how to build cryptography
round these human-friendly primitives. Would these require
ugmented or virtual reality solutions? Is there some component
f human abilities that could be used to build cryptographic
ystems? All these questions would require extensive research
nd experimentation to find good answers.
.5. Theoretical foundations
As mentioned in the previous sections, some of the currently
vailable methods for applying cryptography to human senses
ave good formalisms and security proofs while others do not.
n any case, there is a great variety of different notions, security
argets and threat models that these systems apply, as can be seen
rom Table 2. This of course reflects the variety of human senses
nd their many strengths and limitations.
With the exceptions of visual cryptography and visualizablencryption, many of the proposed notions have not been tightly
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linked to existing cryptographic security notions such as perfect
secrecy, CPA- and CCA-security. Thus, there is a lack of com-
mon theoretical foundation upon which cryptography for human
senses could be built. Formulating this theoretical foundation is
necessary to have similar provable security guarantees for human
cryptography as for traditional cryptography.
As already mentioned, there should also be more advanced
forms of cryptography such as public-key cryptography available
for human senses. An open question is, can this be formalized
and (even partially) realized with similar constructions as in visu-
alizable encryption. The constructions of visualizable encryption
are quite straightforward applications of the existing security
notions. It may very well be that more complex constructions
are needed for public-key cryptography for human senses. Also
related to theoretical foundations are impossibility results that
would reveal that some forms of human cryptography are not
possible to achieve. Forming these foundations is an interesting
topic of future research and something that is outside of the scope
of this paper.
4. Discussion
The main question that needs to be answered before cryptog-
raphy for human senses becomes reality is: What are the human
advantages over computers and machines? When such advantages
are identified, there should be studies in how these could be
leveraged towards cryptography and then how to make these
work over digital media and to scale at a global level.
We propose to shift the paradigm from defining security goals
in a way that leads to cryptographic systems only accessible to
computers and other machines, towards a more human-friendly
cryptography. We argue that it should be possible to build cryp-
tographic protocols and primitives that have meaningful secu-
rity goals and provable security under reasonable assumptions
and that are accessible with human senses and human intelli-
gence and ‘‘computing power’’. The capabilities of the human user
should be integral to the scheme.
One interesting property of human users that needs to be
taken into account is the question of cultural differences and their
effect on the possibilities of cryptography for human senses. Tra-
ditional cryptography is universal in the sense that its function-
ality is not dependent on the age, gender, ethnicity or any other
attribute of the user. Ideally, cryptography for human senses
would also be universal to all people.







































































































Because there are both differences and similarities in the way
eople from different backgrounds perceive things, these need
o be considered and preferably utilize only the most universal
roperties that are available. For example, The World Colour
urvey [79] was established to find out if there are univer-
al constraints on cross-language colour naming, and if there
s an evolutionary progression according to which languages
ain colour terms over time. Analysis of this data has found,
.g., that there are some universal processes that control the nam-
ng of colours [80], and that colour naming across languages re-
lect optimal divisions of an irregularly shaped perceptual colour
pace [81]. Moreover, a review on colour perception and nam-
ng [82] finds that even though language does affect colour
erception, it only affects the right visual field via the activation
f the language regions of the left hemisphere of the brain.
Language also affects the way we hear the world: for exam-
le, in Finnish non-musicians and French musicians pre-attentive
nd attentive processing of duration was enhanced compared to
rench non-musicians [83]. This is due to the fact that Finnish
s a quantity language, and differentiating between ‘‘tuli’’ (fire),
‘tuuli’’ (wind) and ‘‘tulli’’ (Customs) is important. Nevertheless,
ven in languages there seems to be some universality available.
ertain structures seem to be preferable to others, e.g. a syllable
ike ‘‘blif’’ is preferred to syllables like ‘‘bdif’’ and ‘‘lbif’’. Even
ewborns like the first example best [84].
One argument that might go against the idea of cryptography
or human senses is that one might envision a future of enhanced
umans that have abilities to interact with cryptographic proto-
ols in a native way. Such ideas are currently more mainstream
n science fiction, but it might be that at some point this could
e possible in reality. One example of such future is presented in
annu Rajaniemi’s novel The Quantum Thief [85].
In the book, the Martian society has developed a very elab-
rate system called gevulot (Hebrew for ‘‘limits’’), which is es-
entially a PKI system that allows the people to achieve various
evels of privacy and even choose what parts of conversations
nd interactions can be ‘‘remembered’’ by the parties involved.
he citizens of Mars have developed skills and an etiquette on
ow to use this system in their daily lives. Of course, the people
iving in the society have vastly transcended our current human
apabilities.
On the other hand, it might be possible to realize a system
uch like gevulot with current cryptographic methods such as
ttribute-based encryption, homomorphic encryption and other
dvanced cryptographic primitives. Thus, it would be great to
ave these systems work in a way that would be accessible to
rdinary humans. This then would be an argument in favour of
esearching cryptography for human senses.
Another argument against cryptography for human senses is
ser discomfort. As the current paradigm is reliant on heavy
athematics and things just seem to work, it is understandable
hat a regular user would not want to get involved with cryptog-
aphy. Therefore, the usability aspects of cryptography for human
enses are very important, so that the ease of use overcomes the
iscomfort of getting involved. Moreover, in the current state of
ryptography there is no place for the human user in the trust
hain, and without further research we cannot even offer people
he option to get involved.
One possible additional human capability that could be used
s the perception of elapsed time as already done with PRISM.
ime is usually available from many different and independent
ources and humans can approximate the elapsed time with some
ccuracy (say whether something took 5 or 50 s), although there
re a lot of things that can interfere with the perception of time,
or example stimulants and depressants, emotions, and age. Of
ourse, this does not give us very much to work on, but it could
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be a way to build e.g. some form of authentication to a human
cryptography system.
The limitations of different senses and human understanding
of different visual, auditory and haptic sensory input has already
been mentioned. The challenge that this poses towards the the-
oretical development of cryptography for human senses is the
common requirement of correctness of cryptosystems. Correct-
ness means that for any message m, encryption function E and
decryption function D we must have D(E(m)) = m.
However, humans tend to make all sorts of mistakes with
ensory perception and thus it may not be possible to have
ryptography that satisfies the traditional correctness definition.
aving a probabilistic definition for correctness might work, but
t raises the question, what is the result of D(E(m)), when the
uman recognition fails. Will this become a possible side channel
or adversaries and/or an opportunity for denial-of-service type
f attacks?
Another challenge is the key generation and other randomness
hat is necessary for modern cryptography to function. Natu-
al sources have some entropy available, but how can humans
se this entropy without technical devices. On the other hand,
f only entropy from the humans participating in the crypto-
raphic operations is used, will there be enough to provide secure
ncryption.
Biometrics can be used to provide entropy and there are meth-
ds to make this uniform as required by cryptographic protocols
.g. via fuzzy extractors [86]. However, this type of extraction is
ot possible with human senses. Furthermore, humans tend to
e bad at generating randomness as evidenced for example by the
oor choices of passwords that people use for user authentication.
. Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the current state of the art
n cryptography for human senses. Such cryptography has mostly
een built upon the concepts of visual and visualizable cryptogra-
hy, that have already been studied in some detail. Thus there is a
ack of methods that utilize other senses and human capabilities.
urthermore, the current methods cannot realize many of the
ecurity goals for modern cryptography as can be seen from
able 1.
To achieve more advanced security goals and to build a wider
ange of capabilities (e.g. message authentication), there needs
o be further research both in implementations as wells as on
he theoretical foundations. In addition, the possibilities of other
enses than vision should be examined to find new cryptographic
echniques for human senses. We are confident that research in
his area will yield better and more human-friendly cryptographic
ethods that are more accessible with human capabilities. This
ill then result in better building blocks for trust in our ever more
onnected and digital world.
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